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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:  
ARE FRANCHISES OFF THE HOOK,  
OR CAN A TREATY CATCH THEM? 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In July 2015, the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect 
to Human Rights (the “Working Group”) held its first meeting to discuss 
the elaboration of a binding international treaty on business and human 
rights.
1
 These initial treaty discussions follow a long line of work by 
United Nations entities and others in the area of business and human 
rights. The discussions build on both the State’s responsibility to promote 
and protect human rights and the business enterprise’s responsibility to 
respect those rights.
2
 As U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution 26/9 
prescribed, the first session was devoted primarily to “constructive 
deliberations on the content, scope, nature and form of the future 
international instrument.”3 Among other topics, participants debated about 
which types of business arrangements would be targeted by a future 
treaty—would a future treaty target only Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs), or would such a treaty also target other types of business 
arrangements?
4
  
Although much of the business and human rights literature focuses on 
the responsibilities of MNCs or Transnational Corporations (TNCs),
5
 other 
types of business arrangements may also have human rights impacts. John 
Ruggie, former Special Representative for Business and Human Rights to 
the UN Secretary-General, has noted that corporations are increasingly 
structured like a “bundle of contracts”—suppliers, franchise arrangements, 
 
 
 1. The IGWG was established in June 2014 by United Nations Human Rights Council 
Resolution 26/9 to elaborate on an international legally binding instrument on human rights and 
business. United Nations Human Rights Council, Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group On 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect To Human Rights, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Pages/IGWGOnTNC.aspx. 
 2. U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Draft Rep. of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights §§ 53, 77 (July 10, 2015). 
 5. See generally David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 901 (2003); Anniki L. Laine, Integrated Reporting: Fostering Human Rights Accountability 
for Multinational Corporations, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 639 (2015).  
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and joint ventures.
6
 Franchise operations, in particular, range across a wide 
variety of industries, from education services to convenience stores to 
home health care.
7
 International franchises are prominent in a number of 
business sectors: many well-known international brands operate in whole 
or in part through a franchise structure. Hotel chains like Choice,
8
 
Marriott,
9
 and Intercontinental
10
 are commonly operated as franchises. 
Fast food companies, like McDonald’s11 and food and beverage companies 
like Coca-Cola,
12
 are also prominent examples of franchises operating 
internationally on a large scale. The sectors in which the franchisors 
operate are also sectors that touch a variety of human rights issues: hotels 
can be hotspots for human trafficking,
13
 retail operations can be a site of 
labor disputes,
14
 and bottling agreements can deplete scarce local 
resources, most notably water.
15
 These conflicts underscore that franchise 
 
 
 6. John Ruggie, Closing Plenary Remarks at the Third United Nations Forum on Business and 
Human Rights, (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/ForumSession3/ 
Submissions/JohnRuggie_SR_SG_BHR.pdf. 
 7. Examples include 7-Eleven, Inc., Kumon Math and Science Centers, and Home Helpers, a 
home health care service for seniors. For a more comprehensive list, see International Franchise 
Association, http://www.franchise.org (search: international opportunities) (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).  
 8. CHOICE HOTEL FRANCHISE OPPORTUNITIES, http://www.choicehotelsdevelopment.com/ (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2016). 
 9. Marriott offers both franchise and management options. MARRIOTT HOTEL DEVELOPMENT, 
https://hotel-development.marriott.com/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2016). 
 10. Intercontinental reports that it operates over 4,900 hotels under franchise agreements. 
INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL GROUP, http://development.ihg.com/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2016). 
 11. The title to the page, “Welcome to McFranchise,” highlights the degree to which the 
franchise arrangement is part of the corporate identity and model. McDonald’s Corporation, 
http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/franchising.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2016). 
 12. Coca-Cola employs independent bottling franchises for most of its products. COCA-COLA 
COMPANY, http://www.coca-colacompany.com/our-company/the-coca-cola-system/ (last visited Feb. 
13, 2016); see also Richard Feloni, Coca-Cola Isn’t One Giant Corporation—It’s A System Of Almost 
275 Companies, Business Insider (June 22, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/inside-coca-cola-
franchise-system-2015-6. 
 13. See POLARIS PROJECT, HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE HOTEL INDUSTRY, 
https://polarisproject.org/sites/ default/files/human-trafficking-hotel-industry.pdf.  
 14. 7-Eleven: Investigation Exposes Shocking Exploitation of Convenience Store Workers, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.smh.com.au/business/workplace-relations/ 
7eleven-investigation-exposes-shocking-exploitation-of-convenience-store-workers-20150828-gja276. 
html. 
 15. Local leaders in Colombia estimate that a Coca-Cola bottling plant “consumes approximately 
1.68 million cubic meters of water, constituting 68.5 percent of the entire municipality’s water 
consumption.” Lisa Taylor, Coca-Cola’s New Bottling Plant Threatens Workers’ Rights in Colombia, 
LATIN CORRESPONDENT (July 1, 2015), http://latincorrespondent.com/2015/07/coca-colas-new-
bottling-plant-threatens-workers-rights-colombia/. Coca-Cola has also recently suspended bottling at 
three plants in India. Katy Daigle, Coke Suspends Bottling at Plant at Center of Water Dispute, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/coke-suspends-bottling-at-
plant-at-center-of-water-dispute/.  
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operations, like other business entities, have human rights impacts in the 
countries and communities in which they operate.  
In response to calls for greater responsibility in the face of corporate 
human rights impacts, many companies have publicly adopted human 
rights or anti-human trafficking policies or both, with some incorporating 
outside frameworks like the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights.
16
 While companies that operate international franchises 
may have human rights policies, these companies sometimes add a 
disclaimer to their policies explaining that, due to the nature of their 
franchise agreements, conditions may vary by location.
17
 These 
disclaimers are especially common in labor and employment provisions.
18
 
While it is difficult to enforce international human rights laws against 
traditional, vertically integrated multinational corporations (MNCs),
19
 
these kinds of alternative, contract-based arrangements add another level 
of complexity to human rights protection regimes.  
In the current human rights compliance landscape, a company like 
McDonald’s can pledge to serve sustainably sourced beef at its restaurants 
worldwide but at the same time decline to require policies that ensure 
employees at McDonald’s franchise locations are not subject to unfair 
labor practices, human rights abuses, or even human trafficking.
20
 This 
 
 
 16. Some companies that reference the Guiding Principles include PepsiCo, Nestlé, and Toshiba. 
PEPSICO, http://www.pepsico.com/Purpose/Talent-Sustainability/Human-Rights; Nestlé, http://www. 
nestle.com/asset-library/Documents/Library/Documents/Corporate_Governance/Corporate-Business-
Principles-EN.pdf; Toshiba, http://www.toshiba.co.jp/csr/en/performance/social/human_rights.htm. For 
a more complete list of companies that have adopted human rights policies, see the Business and 
Human Rights Resource Centre’s (BHRRC) list of company policy statements on human rights. 
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, http://business-humanrights.org/en/company-policy-
statements-on-human-rights. 
 17. “More than 80% of McDonald’s restaurants are owned and operated by independent 
Franchisees. The Company expects its Franchisees to maintain high standards of integrity and to abide 
by all applicable laws and regulations, including laws regarding human rights, dignity and respect, 
workplace safety, and worker compensation and treatment. Ultimately, Franchisees define and 
implement people practices in their local restaurants.” McDonald’s Corporate Social Responsibility & 
Sustainability Report 81 (2012–2013) (Emphasis added), http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/content/ 
dam/AboutMcDonalds/2.0/pdfs/2012_2013_csr_report.pdf. 
 18. “Because of our franchise structure and the number of locations where McDonald’s operates, 
people policies may differ. Labor standards also vary considerably across the countries and markets 
where we operate, requiring different approaches to people issues and practices.” McDonald’s 
Corporation, Responses to the BHRRC survey on human rights practices, Business and Human Rights 
Resource Centre, http://business-humanrights.org/en/mcdonalds-0 (last visited Feb. 12, 2016). 
 19. See generally David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human 
Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931 (2004); Steven 
R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 
526–30 (2001); John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 
101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819 (2007). 
 20. Regarding supply chain management, McDonald’s CSR report says: 
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paper will explore the duty of business enterprises to respect human rights. 
It will then discuss the efforts to define the scope of a business and human 
rights treaty in the face of the “bundle of contracts”—the structures of 
many business entities, specifically franchise arrangements. Finally, it will 
argue that a treaty covering the duties of franchises could have conflicting 
results: a treaty could provide more stability to the ever-evolving set of 
national franchise liability laws and perhaps encourage countries to open 
their courts to human rights claims against business entities. At the same 
time, increasing the possibility of liability could justify franchise fears 
about voluntarily implementing human rights policies and may ultimately 
incentivize innovation in corporate reorganization to escape treaty 
coverage instead of promoting corporate respect of human rights.  
II. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND DUTY OF BUSINESS TO RESPECT 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The relationship between business and human rights has been a topic of 
intense inquiry and concern for some time,
21
 and many companies have 
responded with some degree of human rights policy.
22
 The Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights have been a major catalyst for 
the transmission of business and human rights norms and the increased 
recognition of corporate responsibility in the area of human rights.
23
 They 
are principles that have been developed to guide companies on human 
rights issues and to establish best practices; notably, the Guiding 
Principles are applicable to all business enterprises regardless of size or 
home country.
24
 The Guiding Principles call on business enterprises to 
meet their duty to respect human rights by developing a policy regarding 
human rights, a due diligence process, and a remediation process to 
 
 
 We are responsible for influencing and reinforcing these three Es [Ethics, Environment, 
Economics] at each level of our supply chain: raw material production, processing, and 
distribution. Among other things, this means working with suppliers to innovate and 
implement best practices for sustainable ingredients, requiring that our suppliers protect 
human rights in the workplace, and safeguarding food quality and safety through best 
practices in animal health and welfare.  
MCDONALD’S, supra note 17, at 35. Contrast this with the company’s statement about labor in 
franchise stores, MCDONALD’S, supra note 18. 
 21. Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 19, at 935. 
 22. BHHRC, supra note 16. 
 23. United Nations Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Respect, Protect and Remedy” Framework, iv (2011), 
HR/PUB/11/04, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.  
 24. Id. at 1. 
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address any violations that surface during their performance of due 
diligence.
25
 
The Guiding Principles are based on the UN “Protect, Respect, and 
Remedy” framework, which discusses three pillars necessary to support 
human rights.
26
 “Protect” in this context applies to States: State actors 
have the duty to protect human rights through policies, legislation, 
regulation, and adjudication.
27
 This is not identical to the duty of 
corporations, which according to the Guiding Principles is to “respect” 
human rights, meaning they will “avoid infringing on the human rights of 
others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they 
are involved.”28 Nonetheless, the Guiding Principles seek to explicitly 
create a duty for businesses to respect human rights, with the view of 
providing remedies for breach of that duty.
29
  
The Guiding Principles are an example of soft law—they are not 
binding, but have been broadly accepted and implemented by state and 
non-state actors.
30
 Since their endorsement, many companies have 
incorporated the Guiding Principles into their corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) policies.
31
 Likewise, investors
32
 have used the 
 
 
 25. These elements are aimed at ensuring companies “know and show that they respect human 
rights.” Id. at 13. The Guiding Principles then go on to discuss in more depth the operational principles 
involved in the policy, due diligence, and remediation requirements. Id. at 16–26. 
 26. Id. http://www.hbsslaw.com/Templates/media/files/08-27-15 (Dkt 1) Complaint for Violation 
of California Consumer Protection Laws (2).PDF. 
 27. Id. at 3. 
 28. Id. at 17. 
 29.  
State-based judicial and non-judicial grievance mechanisms should form the foundation of a 
wider system of remedy. Within such a system, operational-level grievance mechanisms can 
provide early stage recourse and resolution. State-based and operational-level mechanisms, in 
turn, can be supplemented or enhanced by the remedial functions of collaborative initiatives 
as well as those of international and regional human rights mechanisms. 
Id. at 28. 
 30. For a discussion of “soft law” instruments dealing with corporations and human rights, see 
Ratner, supra note 19. 
 31. See, e.g., COCA-COLA.  
 In 2011, The Coca-Cola Company formally endorsed the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights . . . . This framework is a key touchstone for our policies and 
programs related to workplace and human rights. We expect our Company, bottling partners 
and suppliers to avoid causing, or contributing to, adverse human rights impacts as a result of 
business actions. Furthermore, our Company, bottling partners and suppliers are responsible 
for preventing or mitigating adverse human rights impacts directly linked to their operations, 
products or services by their business relationships. 
The Coca-Cola Company, Human and Workplace Rights, http://www.coca-colacompany.com/our-
company/human-workplace-rights/. 
 32. Many institutional, faith-based, and socially responsible investment asset managers engage in 
shareholder advocacy as part of a socially responsible investment plan. One advocacy tool is filing 
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Guiding Principles as a model for reforms they ask of companies.
33
 Many 
countries, including the U.S., are developing National Action Plans for 
implementing the Guiding Principles.
34
 International organizations like the 
Group of 7 (G7) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) have endorsed the Guiding Principles.
35
 Reporting 
mechanisms have recently been developed with an initial focus on 
governance and corporate policies.
36
 These mechanisms do not, however, 
discuss how different corporate structures impact implementation.
37
 The 
Guiding Principles themselves apply to any corporate form: they are not 
limited to traditional MNCs and so, would ostensibly cover franchises. 
Although they are cast in broad language, they do not deal with the 
liability issues and incentives specific to franchise agreements.  
 
 
shareholder resolutions seeking changes in corporate policy. UN WORKING GROUP ON BUSINESS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS, Statement Concerning Shareholder Resolutions Requiring Companies To Perform 
Human Rights Due Diligence (May 13, 2013), http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/ 
media/documents/13_05_13_wg_statement_shareholder_resolutions_and_hr_due_diligence.pdf.  
 33. For example, a shareholder proposal filed at McDonald’s read as follows: “RESOLVED, that 
shareholders of McDonald’s Corporation (“McDonald’s”) urge the Board of Directors to report to 
shareholders, at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information, on McDonald’s process for 
identifying and analyzing potential and actual human rights risks of McDonald’s operations (including 
restaurants owned and operated by franchisees) and supply chain,” and, in the supporting statement, 
“[t]he importance of human rights risk assessment is reflected in the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (the “Ruggie Principles”) approved by the UN Human 
Rights Council in 2011.” McDonald’s Corp., Proxy Statement 48, 49 (Apr. 12, 2013),  
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/63908/000119312513152413/d472792ddef14a.htm. A similar 
resolution was filed the same year at Halliburton. Halliburton Corporation, Proxy Statement 70 (Apr. 
2, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/45012/000004501213000131/hal_ 2013-
proxy.htm#s759C71D47A05A7F70DC52AA53FB3459B.  
 34. Business and Human Rights Resource Centre: National Action Plans, http://business-human 
rights.org/en/un-guiding-principles/implementation-tools-examples/implementation-by-governments/ 
by-type-of-initiative/national-action-plans-2002 (last accessed Feb. 12, 2016). 
 35. The G7 issued a statement in support of Guiding Principles. Sarah A. Altschuller, G7 
Leaders Issue Declaration Supporting Private Sector Implementation of Human Rights Due Diligence, 
CSR AND THE LAW (June 15, 2015), http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2015/06/15/g7-leaders-issue-
declaration-supporting-private-sector-implementation-of-human-rights-due-diligence/. The OECD also 
issued a statement in support. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL ON COMMON APPROACHES FOR OFFICIALLY SUPPORTED EXPORT 
CREDITS AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL DUE DILIGENCE, http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/ 
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=tad/ecg%282012%295&doclanguage=en.  
 36. The organizations Shift and Mazars have collaborated on a reporting framework. UNITED 
NATIONS GUIDING PRINCIPLES REPORTING FRAMEWORK, http://www.ungpreporting.org/ (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2016). 
 37. Id.  
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III. TO CONTROL OR NOT TO CONTROL? THE PROBLEM OF FRANCHISES 
Alongside the development of the Guiding Principles and the related 
implementation tools that have emerged, many corporations have 
established human rights policies that address labor policies, human 
trafficking, rights of children, the right to water, and political speech. 
Franchise operations have consequences for human rights, especially in 
the area of labor rights. Corporate human rights policies are increasingly 
aimed at modern-day slavery and human trafficking.
38
 The latter has been 
especially important in the hotel industry, with organizations like 
ECPAT
39
 working with companies to draft and implement policies with 
the aim of preventing sex trafficking, particularly of children.
40
 Some 
franchise hotels have taken steps toward human rights policies, even 
though the implementation may be constrained by their franchise model. 
Choice, for example, has a human rights policy and provides training to its 
corporate employees, as does Intercontinental.
41
  
Many corporations that operate a franchise model also have a human 
rights policy in place, but under the caveat that it may not be able to 
implement it in its franchise relationships. McDonald’s is one example.42 
 
 
 38. A body of law is developing the United States around trafficking, but this is outside the scope 
of this paper. All 50 states have implemented some kind of trafficking legislation. Erin N. Kauffman, 
Comment, The Uniform Act on Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking: State Law and the 
National Response to Labor Trafficking, 41 J. LEGIS. 291, 292 (2015). In August 2015, some of the 
first lawsuits using California supply chain law were filed against Costco and Nestlé for alleged human 
trafficking and modern-day slavery in their seafood supply chains, notably in Thai fishing operations. 
Class Action Complaint, Barber v. Nestle USA Inc., 15-cv-01364 (C.D. Cal. 2015), 
https://www.hbsslaw.com/uploads/case_downloads/slave_labor/nestle_complaint.pdf (last accessed Nov. 
8, 2015); Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 15-cv-03783, (N.D. Cal. 2015), http://www.cpmlegal.com/ 
media/news/222_Costco%20Prawns%20Complaint.pdf (last accessed Nov 8, 2015). 
 39. ECPAT is a network of local civil society organizations and coalitions with that work to end 
the sexual exploitation of children around the world. ECPAT INTERNATIONAL, http://www.ecpat.org/ 
about-ecpat. 
 40. ECPAT has developed a code of conduct for hotels aimed at preventing child sex tourism and 
sex trafficking. ECPAT INTERNATIONAL, http://www.ecpatusa.org/code (last visited Nov. 8, 2015). 
 41. Choice’s human rights policy is illustrative. It contains provisions for both the rights of 
children and the rights of employees, saying, “Choice Hotels condemns all forms of exploitation of 
children. The Company does not recruit child labor, and support laws duly enacted to prevent and 
punish the crime of sexual exploitation of children. Choice Hotels will work to raise awareness 
concerning such exploitation, and will cooperate with law enforcement authorities to address any such 
instances of exploitation of which the Company becomes aware,” and “Choice Hotels supports and 
upholds the elimination of discriminatory practices with respect to employment and occupation, and 
promotes and embraces diversity in all aspects of its business operations. Choice Hotels further 
supports the elimination of all forms of forced, bonded or compulsory labor and the freedom of 
association.” CHOICE HOTELS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Human Rights Policy Statement, 
https://www.choice hotels.com/about/diversity/human-rights. 
 42. MCDONALD’S, supra note 18. 
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Coca-Cola has itself recently pointed out the lack of control it currently 
exercises over its franchisees: in many of their global operations, the 
bottles and trucks say Coca-Cola, but they have no control over what’s 
actually happening.
43
 People on the ground see the corporate logo and 
brand, and for practical purposes do not separate the franchisor from the 
franchisee.
44
 This puts franchisors in the position of disavowing control 
over the practices of its franchisees while still being associated in the 
popular mind with human rights risk in franchisee operations. Faced with 
this dilemma, a franchisor might wish to influence franchisee behavior, 
but may also hold back because of the particular nature of the franchise 
relationship.
45
 
McDonald’s has flagged the franchise agreement as a barrier to 
implementing human rights policies. McDonald’s adopted a human rights 
policy in 2014, but with the caveat that it could not impose the policy on 
franchisees. Specifically, McDonald’s reports that: 
Because of our franchise structure and the number of locations 
where McDonald’s operates, people policies may differ. Labor 
standards also vary considerably across the countries and markets 
where we operate, requiring different approaches to people issues 
and practices. . . . More than 80% of McDonald’s restaurants are 
owned and operated by independent franchisees . . . Ultimately, 
franchisees define and implement people practices in their locally-
operated restaurants.
46
  
 
 
 43. Brent Wilton, How Respecting Human Rights Protects Our Brands, Press Release, 
http://www.einnews.com/pr_news/286891039/brent-wilton-how-respecting-human-rights-protects-
our-brands. 
 44. If Coca-Cola were describing U.S.-based operations, this statement could lay the basis for a 
claim of liability based on apparent agency. See Bartholomew v. Burger King Corp., 15 F. Supp.3d 
1043, 1050 (D. Haw. 2014). 
 45. For one possible model for a franchisor/franchisee best practices guide, see Business for 
Social Responsibility’s (BSR) guidelines for licensors. This is one of the few in-depth examples 
available. BSR, GOOD PRACTICES FOR COMPLYING WITH LICENSORS’ SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
REQUIREMENTS (2011), http://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/report-view/good-practices-for-complying-
with-licensors-social-and-environmental-requir. 
 46. Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, McDonald’s Company Action Plan Survey 
Response, https://business-humanrights.org/en/mcdonalds-0?issues%5B%5D=11245. In 2014, the 
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre contacted 180 companies asking them to provide 
information on their policies & practices on human rights. The survey questions can be found at 
https://business-humanrights.org/en/company-action-platform-survey-questions-in-9-languages. Supplier 
contracts even contain employment provisions. For example: “The Supplier Code of Conduct outlines 
our expectation that every McDonald’s supplier will comply with all labor laws and with our own 
standards for minimum work ages and conditions of employment.” McDonald’s Corporate Social 
Responsibility & Sustainability Report 81 (2012–2013) (http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/content/ 
dam/AboutMcDonalds/2.0/pdfs/2012_2013_csr_report.pdf. 
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At the same time, McDonald’s has developed “guiding principles” for its 
supplier contracts, including a workplace accountability audit program.
47
 
This begs the question: Why are contracts dealing with ingredients and 
durable goods subject to greater scrutiny than contracts that deal with 
human beings who are working in an establishment with the company 
name on it?  
The discussion around what kinds of business relationships should be 
covered under a prospective treaty highlights that, although it sounds like 
a broad term, “corporate responsibility” in its current form may not reach 
all of the actors that may influence or violate human rights policies. 
Although NGOs, working groups, and activists have all identified 
corporate structure as a major barrier to access to remedies for human 
rights abuses,
48
 much of the focus has been on human rights practices in 
company supply chains, not in licensing or franchising agreements. 
However, franchise arrangements also pose a liability problem as 
individuals try to file human rights claims.
49
 The State of Play report on 
corporate responsibility and human rights, produced by the Institute for 
Human Rights and Business (IHRB) and The Global Business Initiative on 
Human Rights (GBI), identifies franchising and licensing arrangements as 
source of human rights risk for companies, and notes that franchise 
arrangements pose challenges distinct from those in supplier agreements.
50
  
Generally, the franchise relationship consists of two legally 
independent businesses that are nonetheless symbiotic and 
interdependent.
51
 Because of this close relationship, parties often try to 
establish that the franchisor (who frequently has deeper pockets) is 
 
 
 47. MCDONALD’S, Supplier Code of Conduct, https://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/content/dam/ 
AboutMcDonalds/Sustainability/Library/Supplier_Code_of_Conduct.pdf. 
 48. Amnesty International discussed this at length in its 2014 report on remedies available for 
human rights abuses, noting that: 
These networks of entities and arrangements, and the way in which they interrelate, can be 
transparent or highly opaque . . . an individual affected by the operations of entities involved 
in these networks or arrangements would face additional difficulties in obtaining a remedy. 
Lines of command and control within and between the arms of the multinational corporation 
are often obscure and deliberately blurred. 
Injustice Incorporated: Corporate Abuses and the Human Right to Remedy, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, 115 (2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol30/001/2014/en/. Although it 
mentions franchises, most of its analysis focuses on parent company liability in multinationals. Id. at 
115–18. 
 49. State of Play: The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights in Business 
Relationships, Global Business Initiative on Human Rights and Institute for Human Rights and 
Business (2012), http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/state-of-play/State-of-Play-Full-Report.pdf. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Gregg Rubenstein, Francesca Turritto, Penny Ward & Larry Weinberg, Vicarious and Other 
Franchisor Liability, 9 INT’L J. FRANCHISING L. 3 (2011). 
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vicariously liable for the actions of the franchisee.
52
 Different countries 
approach the issue of franchisor liability differently, which is increasingly 
important as franchise operations expand internationally.
53
  
“The franchisor-franchisee relationship is unique in that it has 
characteristics of both an arm’s length business transaction as well as an 
ongoing business relationship.”54 The interests of franchisors and 
franchisees do not always align, and human rights violations may be an 
emerging area where this is especially true. The franchisor has an interest 
in protecting its brand and controlling negative publicity, whereas the 
franchisee seeks to maximize the profitability of his own business; public 
relations damage to the brand as a whole may be more far-reaching than 
the damage to the individual owner who engages in questionable labor or 
other human rights practices. The recent scandal of 7-11 franchises in 
Australia provides an example: a media investigation uncovered that the 
owners of several franchises were not adequately compensating employees 
and even running fraudulent visa schemes out of 7-11 stores.
55
 A former 
Australian 7-11 “Franchisee of the Year” was even operating a consulting 
business for other 7-11 franchisees just days after being fined for 
underpaying his workers.
56
Company representatives from 7-11 were called 
to testify before the Australian Senate to respond to accusations of 
widespread wage exploitation across its franchises.
57
 In these examples, 
the actions of the franchisees to maximize their own profits by cutting 
corners on labor and human rights practices jeopardized the 7-11 
franchisor’s brand in the Australian market.  
U.S. courts have confirmed that U.S. franchisors can escape liability 
for their franchisees’ actions abroad. The case of Sinaltrainal v. Coca-
Cola, Co. provides an example of a franchise arrangement preventing 
access to a remedy for alleged international human rights abuses.
58
 
 
 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. See supra note 7 for examples of international franchises.  
 54. Norman D. Bishara & Cindy A. Schipani, A Corporate Governance Perspective on the 
Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 303 (2013–2014). 
 55. Adele Ferguson & Sarah Danckert, 7-Eleven Workers Pay up to $70,000 for Visa in 
Indentured Labor Scheme, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 23, 2015, http://www.smh.com.au/ 
business/7eleven-workers-pay-up-to-70000-for-visa-in-indentured-labour-scheme-20150923-gjsxzh. 
html#ixzz3nNIW1dzV. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003). The plaintiff, 
Sinaltrainal, is a Colombian agricultural labor union. SINALTRAINAL, http://www.sinaltrainal.org/. It is 
interesting to note that even though this case was decided in 2003, issues in the area persist. A 
Mexican franchise of Coca-Cola remains under fire in Colombia for its anti-union labor practices, 
including allegations of continued association with armed groups. Taylor, supra note 15. In April, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/10
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Sinaltrainal involved a Coca-Cola bottling operation in Colombia.
59
 The 
plaintiff, a Colombian labor union, alleged that the Colombian bottler 
collaborated with paramilitaries, resulting in the death of several union 
workers.
60
 Sinaltrainal brought a claim in U.S. District Court under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act.
61
 The plaintiff claimed that the bottling agreement, 
a form of franchise agreement, established that Coca-Cola controlled the 
bottling operation.
62
 The court looked at the franchise agreement and held 
that Coca-Cola “did not have a duty to monitor, enforce or control labor 
policies at a bottling plant.”63 The only standards the agreement imposed 
related to protecting the Coca-Cola product itself in the market place; it 
did not impose any duty related to labor practices.
64
 The court dismissed 
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed 
to establish that Coca-Cola acted jointly with the bottler in the violation of 
international law.
65
  
Sinaltrainal highlights the problem franchise agreements pose in the 
scheme of remedies for human rights: even if the underlying claim is 
admissible in U.S. courts, a franchise agreement has been held to be 
insufficient to establish liability for the actions of the franchisee that 
violate international human rights law. Franchises and other corporate 
forms may be gaining popularity precisely because they create a web of 
contracts that obscures the controlling relationships that could be used to 
establish liability.  
Some have proposed a redefinition of the duties owed in the franchisor-
franchisee relationship, suggesting that it be modeled off a fiduciary 
relationship like that developed to prevent agency problems in corporate 
governance generally.
66
 This could be a promising approach in the field of 
CSR, and human rights in particular. If a corporate franchisor like 
McDonald’s or Coca-Cola publically declares its approach to protecting 
human rights, it would not be unreasonable to expect that a franchisee 
would not do anything to harm or undermine that stated corporate policy. 
A fiduciary relationship could encourage compliance, but would likely be 
 
 
union members went on a hunger strike to demand changes in company policy. Trabajadores de Coca 
Cola en Huelga de hambre, Apr. 13, 2015, http://www.sinaltrainal.org/index.php/empresas20/coca-
cola18/4377-trabajadores-de-coca-cola-en-huelga-de-hambre. 
 59. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345. 
 60. Id. at 1349. 
 61. Id. at 1348. 
 62. Id. at 1354. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1360. 
 66. Bishara & Schipani, supra, note 54, at 323. 
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met with resistance as it would also change the very nature of the franchise 
relationship and the liability structure on which franchise operations have 
come to rely. 
Without restructuring franchises altogether, is there any incentive for 
franchises to develop human rights regimes? Current efforts to develop 
norms and rules governing corporate responsibilities in protecting human 
rights have relied primarily on voluntary compliance measures (often 
developed internally) and soft law instruments (developed on the 
international level).
67
 There is no binding state or international law that 
mandates companies to adopt or implement a human rights policy, yet 
many do, which indicates that there is likely some incentive or benefit to 
the company in doing so.  
One possible explanation is simple self-interest: there may be a 
strategic advantage to adopting various corporate social responsibility 
programs. Companies “have been increasingly motivated by recognition of 
the potential economic value of sustainable business practices.”68 In the 
area of environmental sustainability, this argument is more clear: reducing 
waste and fuel consumption, conserving resources, and focusing on 
efficiency can provide tangible cost savings when it comes to materials 
and utilities.
69
 
In the area of human rights, however, the correlation between corporate 
profitability and human rights is not as clear. Presumably, inexpensive 
labor is a boon for companies, and protecting labor and human rights may 
cost more than it saves.
70
 Although conservation of resources is not at play 
 
 
 67.  In Canada, soft and hard laws are informing each other. “These claims rest on a theory that 
international norms such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights form a standard 
of care that, when violated, constitutes actionable negligence. These “norms” were previously regarded 
as nonbinding “soft law,” but the Canadian developments could transform them into binding “hard 
law” enforceable through awards of civil damages. The practical effects of this trend include a 
growing effort to use Canada as a forum for redressing alleged human rights violations committed 
overseas, and an emphatic need for employers to consider developing and implementing effective 
codes of conduct for their supply chains.” John Kloosterman, Sari Springer, Trent Sutton & Lavanga 
Wijekoon, In Canada, Foreign Workers Seek to Use International Norms as the Standard of Care in 
Negligence Claims Against Multinationals Operating Overseas, JD SUPRA, 9/16/2015, 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/in-canada-foreign-workers-seek-to-use-77833/ (last visited Nov. 8, 
2015). 
 68. Stephen Kim Park & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, A Firm-Driven Approach to Global 
Governance and Sustainability, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 255, 272 (2015). 
 69. Wal-Mart, for example, was able to save over $200 million in 2009 by reducing packaging 
and making delivery routes more efficient. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared 
Value, 89 HARVARD BUS. REV. 62, 69 (2011); see also, E. Lynn Grayson & Gary P. Kjelleren, The 
Business Case for Environmental Sustainability. BUS. L. TODAY (Jan. 2015), http://www.americanbar. 
org/publications/blt/2015/01/03_grayson.html.  
 70.  Concerns have been raised “that rather than reduce risks for companies, human rights due 
diligence could actually increase a company’s risks of liability.” John F. Sherman, III & Amy Lehr, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/10
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in human rights, like with environmental sustainability strong human 
rights policies can have an effect on company reputation,
71
 with 
responsible sourcing contributing to a “better public image and 
. . . stronger community relations.”72  
A more salient concept for human rights due diligence may be risk 
management, not cost savings.  
MNCs not only bear legal risks associated with managing their 
supply chains, but may also face heightened reputational risks 
arising from legal or ethical violations committed by their suppliers 
abroad, such as pollution, sweatshops, and child labor. In order to 
manage and mitigate these legal and reputational risks, MNCs 
incorporate terms in supply chain contracts and supplier codes of 
conduct that require their suppliers to use global environmental and 
social standards more stringent than local law and implement 
monitoring systems to ensure compliance by suppliers with these 
terms.
73
 
Traditional MNCs have some incentive to voluntarily engage in CSR, as 
shown by the numerous examples of corporate human rights policies 
throughout this paper.
74
 Most MNCs can securely develop human rights 
policies because they either unequivocally have control over their 
employees and operations or because under traditional corporate law their 
business structures solidly shield them from liability.
75
 Franchisors, on the 
other hand, may actually risk exposing themselves to liability by requiring 
franchisees to implement corporate human rights policies: telling a 
franchisee how it must treat its employees, what kind of ongoing training 
 
 
Human Rights Due Diligence: Is It Too Risky? Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working 
Paper No. 55. 4 (2010), Harvard University John. F. Kennedy School of Government, 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_55_shermanlehr.pdf. 
 The counter argument has so far been that “human rights due diligence enables a company to 
identify potential human rights risks and address them before they occur, which should reduce the 
company’s exposure to litigation of all kinds, and help the company defend against human rights 
claims that might be filed.” . Id.  
 71. Moreover, “[c]orporate directors are being held more accountable for the effects of their 
decisions on the environment and society.” Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The 
Convenient Truth of How the Business Judgment Rule Protects A Board’s Decision to Engage in 
Social Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 634 (2007). 
 72. Park & Berger-Walliser, supra note 68, at 274. 
 73. Id. at 283.  
 74. Supra note 16. See also CDP SUPPLY CHAIN PROGRAM, https://www.cdp.net/supplychain 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
 75. Amnesty International, supra note 48. See also Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Liability for 
Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien Tort Statute and Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 
2161 (2012). 
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to provide, could bring the franchisor closer to exercising control over the 
labor policies that could, themselves, harm the human rights of employees. 
If a meticulous food preparation policy can establish control over a 
hamburger, it is possible that courts could find that comprehensive human 
rights policies demonstrate adequate control over franchisee labor 
practices to render the franchisor liable for human rights infractions.
76
   
How franchises implement Human Rights policies is largely up to 
them.
77
 As Christine Bader notes, “McDonald’s is already going through 
great lengths to ensure good working conditions in the other direction in 
its value chain,”78 that is to say, in its supplier relationships.79 Although 
companies might balk at requiring and enforcing human rights standards, 
this resistance is not du e to lack of capacity but instead stems from the 
desire to minimize franchisor liability.
80
 The question is not whether they 
can influence or control franchisees training, labor policies, or other areas 
of human rights concern, but whether they are willing to do so given the 
potential for liability any added levels of control over franchisee activities 
might create. Bader suggests that “McDonald’s should apply to 
franchisees a model similar to the one it uses for its suppliers,” including a 
compliance support team of “internal staff and independent auditors.”81 In 
the prescient words of Coca-Cola’s Director for Global Workplace Rights, 
“ultimately, it is a question of just getting started.”82 That is to say, the 
barriers lie with incentives, not with capacity.   
 
 
 76. See Bartholomew v. Burger King Corp., 15 F.Supp.3d 1043 (D. Haw. 2014) (holding that 
Burger King’s detailed specifications as to preparation of the Whopper demonstrated significant 
control over instrumentality that caused harm to incur liability for the injury).  
 77. See Christine Bader, McDonald’s Already Knows How to Manage Its Franchisee Labor 
Practices, HARVARD BUS. REV. (July 31, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/mcdonalds-already-knows-
how-to-manage-its-franchisee-labor-practices/; see also, Bob Steinberger, Protect Your Franchise 
from the Same Fate as McDonald’s, HUFFPOST BUS. (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/bob-steinberger/protect-your-franchise-fr_b_5980030.html.  
 78. Bader, supra note 77, at 1. 
 79. MCDONALD’S, supra note 20. 
 80. For example, to ensure uniformity throughout the world, all franchisees must use 
standardized McDonald’s branding, menus, design layouts and administration systems. The license 
agreement also insists the franchisee uses the same manufacturing or operating methods and maintains 
the quality of the menu items. Id. See MCDONALD’S, Franchise agreement, http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1508478/000119312511077213/dex101.htm. 
 81. Bader, supra note 77, at 2. 
 82. Ed Potter, How to Implement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.coca-colacompany.com/coca-cola-unbottled/how-to-implement-the-un-
guiding-principles-on-business-and-human-rights/. 
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IV. REMEDIES: FROM VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE TO A BINDING 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 
It is the Third Pillar—Remedy—that is both the most feared and the 
most underdeveloped of the Guiding Principles. It is also the pillar with 
the most direct capacity to change incentives and thus change behavior. 
The Guiding Principles themselves envisage access to courts as a remedy, 
but voluntary compliance programs and private regulation are other 
possible ways to shape corporate policy and behavior.
83
 Legal remedy 
may, in fact, be a double edged sword in a system aimed at franchise 
organizations.  
The landscape of remedies is patchwork and, arguably, inadequate.
84
 
Even in the current landscape, however, franchisors are hesitant to engage 
in private regulation for fear of incurring liability but at the same time 
none of the available instruments seem to allow parties who might 
experience human rights abuses at the hands of a franchisee any legal 
recourse. Private regulation has been embraced, but only insofar as it 
limits liability, creating a tension between binding instruments/remedies 
and voluntary compliance.
85
 Corporations are willing to do some work on 
 
 
 83.  Voluntary compliance and corporate self-regulation are not a panacea: “[t]he Achilles heel 
of self-regulatory arrangements to date is their underdeveloped accountability mechanisms.” John 
Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 
819, 836 (2007). Although accountability mechanisms are slowly being developed, this criticism still 
holds. It may, however, be preferable to encourage participation in self-regulation in this period where 
judicial remedies are still developing.  
 84. Anna Grear & Burns H. Weston. The Betrayal of Human Rights and the Urgency of 
Universal Corporate Accountability: Reflections on a Post-Kiobel Lawscape, 15 HUMAN RIGHTS L. 
REV. 21. For a comparative report on access to remedies in the U.S. and internationally, see Gwynne 
Skinner, Robert McCorquodale & Olivier De Schutter, The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies 
for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business, Report prepared for the International 
Corporate Accountability Roundtable, CORE, and The European Coalition for Corporate Justice (Dec. 
2013), available at http://icar.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/The-Third-Pillar-Access-to-Judicial-
Remedies-for-Human-Rights-Violation-by-Transnational-Business.pdf. A recent report in the UK 
found that “the current access to a remedy in the UK for these types of claims is limited, with most of 
the non-judicial mechanisms unable to provide a remedy at all to the victims. Further, victims of such 
abuses, particularly abuses taking place overseas, face significant barriers.” Robert McCorquodale, 
Survey of the Provision in the UK of Access to Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Harms involving 
Business Enterprises (July 17, 2015), http://corporate-responsibility.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ 
BIICL-McQuordale_-uk_access_to_remedies.pdf. 
 85. This tension was visible as corporations struggled to respond to the Rana Plaza factory 
collapse in Bangladesh. Two different organizations were formed: the Alliance and the Accord.  
In May 2013, about seventy retailers, including major European retailers such as H&M, 
Carrefour, Benetton, and Marks & Spencer, agreed to the Accord on Fire and Building Safety 
in Bangladesh, a plan, promoted by labor and consumer groups, to require inspections and to 
finance safety improvements in Bangladeshi garment factories. Most major U.S. retailers 
declined to join the plan, citing perceived risks of legal liability. . . .  
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their own, but the risk of liability may discourage them from 
implementing policies they might otherwise consider.  
Because they see voluntary programs as only part of the solution and 
note that enforcement against private entities still not strong enough, 
human rights groups (and some States) are calling for a binding 
international instrument to address business and human rights.
86
 Four 
years after the endorsement of the Guiding Principles, several states 
petitioned the UN OCHR to for a working group to explore the possibility 
of a binding international treaty on human rights and business.
87
 At this 
time, there is no international consensus that a treaty is in fact needed: 
there is a popular soft law option in place, but many stakeholders felt the 
need for a tool that creates hard law remedies.
88
  
One area of heated debate is what kinds of business entities would be 
targeted by a business and human rights treaty. Some propose that the 
treaty target transnational corporations (TNCs), with the focus being 
specifically on the transnational character of their operations.
89
 Even if 
TNCs are the primary target, a treaty that targets only TNCs and not 
companies acting domestically will miss large swaths of the economy in 
many countries. Although TNCs have a tremendous presence in many 
States, the victims of human rights abuses likely do not care whether a 
large TNC or a state-owned enterprise was the violator.  
Some EU member states left the initial session: “some EU member 
states (Bulgaria, France, Italy, Latvia, Lichtenstein, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Sweden) and Switzerland participated initially in the IWG. 
However, after the second day they withdrew because their demand to 
widen the scope of the work beyond transnational corporations was 
 
 
 In July 2013, an alliance of seventeen major U.S. retailers including Wal-Mart, Gap, J.C. 
Penney, Macy’s, Target, Sears, Nordstrom, and L.L. Bean, announced their own plan, the 
Bangladesh Worker Safety Initiative. 
John R. Crook, U.S. Clothing Retailers Adopt Factory Safety Plan for Bangladesh, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 
918, 919 (2013). See also Steven Greenhouse & Elizabeth A. Harris, Battling for a Safer Bangladesh, 
NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/business/international/ 
battling-for-a-safer-bangladesh.html. 
 86. Before the endorsement of the Guiding Principles, some thought legally binding instruments 
would not be forthcoming. Scott Jerbi, Business and Human Rights at the UN: What Might Happen 
Next?, 31 Hum. Rts. L.Q. 299 (2009). 
 87. UN Human Rights Council, supra note 2. 
 88. For a complete discussion and debate of the first round of treaty talks, see the blog series 
“Debate the Treaty” hosted by the Business and Human Rights Resource Center, http://business-
humanrights.org/en/about-us/blog/debate-the-treaty. 
 89. UN Human Rights Council, supra note 2. 
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rejected.”90 At this time there is no consensus on what kind of business 
entities should be targeted—developing countries seek protection for 
domestic companies, but EU States argue for any treaty to apply to all 
business entities, creating what would be an equal playing field of 
minimum standards for all businesses, including both TNCs and local 
domestic competitors.  
In the context of franchising, there is some question whether the 
franchise structure would allow companies to skirt the “transnational” 
category.
91
 A company may be present in markets across the world 
through local owners and operators, perhaps making the link between the 
parent company and any on-the-ground activities so remote as to exempt 
the corporation from meeting the definition as a TNC.
92
  
Any treaty that narrowly defines the types of corporate entities that will 
be subject to enforcement would create a situation which would challenge 
corporate actors to create innovative structures to escape liability. Other 
stakeholders, including UN Special Representative on Business and 
Human Rights, have encouraged participants in the treaty talks to broaden 
the focus of the treaty to include as many different types of corporate 
structures as possible.
93
 A treaty that targets only MNCs will not address 
any of the problems discussed above. Because franchises and human rights 
are not covered under standard legal instruments, there needs to be a treaty 
 
 
 90. INT’L ORG. OF EMP’RS, First Session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group 
on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights: 
Summary of Proceedings (July 13, 2015), http://www.ioe-emp.org/fileadmin/ioe_documents/ 
publications/Policy%20Areas/business_and_human_rights/EN/_2015-07-13__C-164_First_Session_ 
of_the_IWG_on_TNCs_and_other_business_enterprises_on_human_rights_IOE_Summary_of_Procee
dings.pdf; See also EUROPEAN COAL. FOR CORP. JUSTICE, UN Treaty on Business & Human Rights 
Negotiations Day 1—Divide Emerges Between EU and Other Delegations (July 7, 2015), 
http://www.corporatejustice.org/UN-Treaty-on-Business-Human-Rights-negotiations-ECCJ-Daily-
Summary.html; for the EU contribution to the UN Treaty on Business & Human Rights Negotiations 
see UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, Written Contribution 
by European Union, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session1/Pages/ 
WrittenContributions.aspx. 
 91. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a multinational corporation is a “company with 
operations in two or more countries, generally allowing it to transfer funds and products according to 
price and demand conditions, subject to risks such as changes in exchange rates or political 
instability.” Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Nota bene the definition dates 
back to 1960.  
 92. International regulation of franchises is not unprecedented. Despite what appears to be a 
loophole exempting franchise relationships from international law, there are treaties that do affect 
franchises. Copyright, patent, tax, and trade treaties all touch the franchise relationship, as does the 
United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods. John R. F. Baer, Dr. Karsten Metslaff, 
& Larry Weinberg, International Treaties, Conventions, and Agreements Affecting Franchising, 2 
INT’L J. FRANCHISING L. 3 (2004). 
 93. Ruggie, supra note 6. 
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that specifically includes them.
94
 In the end, any treaty should seek to 
avoid incentives for corporations to restructure to avoid liability by 
designing an instrument that encompasses all business entities and 
structures, and does not allow businesses to utilize loopholes by engaging 
in franchising or licensing.
95
 That franchises could find themselves exempt 
is an example of the kind of weak access to remedies that a treaty would 
aim to address. This pillar cannot be fully realized if creative adaptation of 
the corporate form to avoid liability is allowed.  
V. KIOBEL—THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM (WHAT GOOD IS A TREATY?) 
Even if a treaty was to pass and franchises were included, access to 
remedies in the U.S. would be difficult after the Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum decision limited the kinds of cases that could be brought under 
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
96
 Before Kiobel, the ATS seemed like a 
promising vehicle for human rights litigation against corporations,
97
 and a 
business and human rights treaty could have provided another 
international law tool by which to bring these claims. But in Kiobel, the 
Supreme Court held that the ATS did not reach extraterritorially, 
contracting access to U.S. courts for individuals harmed in other countries 
by corporate activity. In Kiobel, Nigerian citizens brought suit in the U.S. 
for alleged abuses relating to local resistance of oil exploration. The Court 
did not rule on the merits of the violation of international law, instead 
analyzing the ATS and holding that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS.
98
 The Kiobel decision 
sent shockwaves through the scholarly community working on business 
 
 
 94. CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, Human Rights Caucus Reaction to the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.cesr.org/downloads/HR_Caucus_ 
Reaction_Agenda2030.pdf. 
 95. Tom Mackall, Limiting the Application of the Treaty to Certain Corporate Entities Could 
Leave Victims Without Access to Remedy, http://business-humanrights.org/en/limiting-the-application-
of-the-treaty-to-certain-corporate-entities-could-leave-victims-without-access-to-remedy (last accessed 
2/9/2016). 
 96. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).  
 97. Mirela V. Hristova, The Alien Tort Statute: A Vehicle for Implementing the United Nations 
Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights and Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility, 
47 U.S.F. L. REV. 89 (2012). Hristova’s analysis is based on the 2010 2nd Circuit Kiobel decision, not 
the Supreme Court opinion. For a discussion on pre-Kiobel trends in ATS litigation, see Jonathan C. 
Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in 
Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456, 461 (2011). Drimmer and Lamoree note 
that “some two-dozen industries in total have been the subject of one or more ATS lawsuits,” 
indicating widespread use of the ATS to reach corporate behavior overseas. Id. at 461. 
 98. Id.  
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and human rights, and the status of human rights claims against 
corporations under the ATS.
99
  
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IS IN FLUX 
The liability environment for business entities and human rights is in 
flux—although decisions in U.S. courts have limited extraterritorial 
human rights tort claims, litigation is proceeding in other countries.
100
 
Even in the absence of international consensus, there may still emerge an 
increased risk to companies, even franchises, that developments in 
national law will create uneven liability across different markets. 
There are several cases currently at large in Canadian courts premised 
to varying degrees on extraterritorial human-rights based tort liability.
101
 
On labor issues,
102
 there have also been some developments in Canada, 
such that even though Kiobel precludes U.S. claims, Canada may be an 
option for individuals harmed in other countries to seek a remedy for their 
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the human right to water. Since so many human rights issues stem from labor rights related to 
organizing, fair wages, and working conditions, one approach could be to treat franchisors as joint 
employers in matters of international labor issues. On the issue of labor rights, if U.S. courts lean 
toward considering franchises joint employers and begin to hold them accountable for wages and labor 
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little encouragement of employee involvement.” Peter Cappelli & Monika Hamori, Are Franchises 
Bad Employers?, 61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 147 (2008). As such, I would argue they may be more 
susceptible to abuse since their workforces are lower-paid and lower-resourced. 
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harm.
103
 Denmark, too, has been working to allow extraterritorial human 
rights claims in its courts.
104
 In Kenya, Coca-Cola has settled on cases that 
have arisen out of bottling contracts.
105
 Brazil has been conducting 
inquiries into McDonald’s practices, and unions in Brazil are developing 
litigation strategies against McDonald’s franchises on labor issues.106 
McDonald’s is one of the most visible targets for human rights suits 
related to labor and franchises; even now, in a world without a treaty and 
with little access to U.S. courts, McDonald’s is facing litigation 
concerning its labor practices.  
Although U.S. courts have in the past held that franchisors are not 
liable for the human rights violation of their franchisees, human rights 
responsibilities nonetheless add another layer to a franchisor’s risk 
management strategy. As States consider adopting stricter laws addressing 
supply chain transparency and human rights obligations of corporate 
actors, franchisors need to consider whether their franchise agreements 
maintain sufficient separation between themselves and their franchisees to 
avoid vicarious liability in a given State.   
 
 
 103.  Global Business Initiative on Human Rights and Institute for Human Rights and Business, 
supra note 49.  
 Non-Canadian workers are increasingly suing their employers in Canadian courts for human rights 
violations allegedly committed outside Canada by the companies themselves or by other entities in 
their supply chains. This development seems to be spurred by recent U.S. cases limiting the rights of 
workers and their representatives from bringing these claims in the United States. 
 John Kloosterman, Trent Sutton, Sari Spinger & Lavanga Wikekoon, International Norms as the 
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LITTLER (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/canada-foreign-workers-
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 104. Kendal Human Rights Consulting, CSR and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction—International Law 
Boundaries To Human Rights Litigation (Feb. 2014), http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/ 
Documents/Danida/Partners/Research-Org/Research-studies/CRS%20and%20Extraterritorial%20Juris 
diction %202014.pdf (last viewed Sept. 4, 2015). 
 105. Dalton Nyabundi & Elvis Ondieki, Coca-Cola given 90 days to pay Busia claimants, 
BUSINESS DAILY AFRICA (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Coca-
Cola-given-90-days-to-pay-Busia-claimants/-/539550/2548216/-/y7fy97z/-/index.html. 
 106. “The company has been under pressure in Brazil since February, when the country’s three 
largest trade unions filed a lawsuit against McDonald’s and Arcos Dourados, accusing it of ‘social 
dumping’—widespread and systematic labour abuses.” Bruce Douglas, McDonald’s Faces Global 
Scrutiny at Brazilian Senate’s Human Rights Hearing, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/20/mcdonalds-brazil-human-rights-committee-hearing? 
CMP=share_btn_tw. 
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VII. PROS AND CONS OF A TREATY 
With limited access to U.S. courts, a treaty may encourage other States 
to open their courts to claims of human rights violations;
107
 one possible 
view is that the limitation on accessibility for extraterritorial claims in the 
U.S. could make an international treaty all the more important. The 
European Parliament supports the need for a binding instrument,
108
 and if 
large, modern economies like in the Euro Zone are prepared to accept and 
ultimately implement a treaty, U.S. franchisors will likely pay some 
notice. That said, unless national courts revise their corporate legal codes, 
franchise relationships may still be too remote to invoke liability.  
Faced with a volatile environment, the benefit of a treaty would be that 
it would make human rights liability rules uniform internationally, 
removing the uncertainty about whether the same franchise agreement 
with a Brazilian owner could result in a different liability risk than the 
same agreement would pose in the United States. A treaty could change 
the rules of corporate liability by creating international law that requires 
the adoption of new rules of corporate law in States signatory to the 
agreement. As it stands, international franchisors may need to conduct 
comparative analysis of all of the countries in which they operate, since 
the duties and liabilities of corporations are themselves a creature of law. 
Ultimately, it might be easier for businesses to have a treaty that lays out 
the rules and simplifies the duties of franchises.  
Notwithstanding arguments in favor of a treaty, a treaty may or may 
not change anything. If a treaty specifically targets only TNCs, franchise 
owners could try to claim the same exemptions as domestic companies, 
arguing they are owned and operated locally. This will ultimately be a 
question for national courts to determine, unless other nations open their 
courts to extraterritorial human rights claims. However, even with a treaty, 
franchisors may be able to pass liability off onto franchisees. 
VIII. COULD KIOBEL BE A BLESSING IN DISGUISE? 
If U.S. courts were the only consideration, Kiobel could be a blessing 
in disguise for those seeking greater voluntary human rights interventions 
 
 
 107. See Amnesty International, supra note 48 (discussing litigation options in a variety of 
countries). 
 108. EUROPEAN COALITION FOR CORPORATE JUSTICE, Event Summary: Towards a Legally 
Binding Instrument on Business and Human Rights, European Parliament (Sept. 2015), http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Summary%20of%20EP%20Event%20on%20UN%20Tr
eaty.pdf. 
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from franchisors. Although Kiobel limits access to judicial remedies, that 
limiting may itself open up space for business entities to develop more 
robust human rights policies for franchisees precisely because of the lesser 
chance of being hailed to court in the U.S. if the franchisees violate those 
policies. In the absence of that risk for claims originating outside the U.S., 
franchisors can treat their franchisees more like they treat their suppliers, 
and increase the human rights due diligence requirements of those 
franchisees through their franchise agreements with those franchisees.  
Despite objections that the franchise relationship inhibits the 
implementation of human rights policies,
109
 franchisors can currently 
impose whatever human rights policies they want, and even enforce them, 
without fear of liability for the employment practices of their franchisees 
because liability for human rights violations will be subject to a territorial, 
not agency-related, analysis in U.S. courts under Kiobel. In establishing 
this territorial, as opposed to agency-related, analysis, Kiobel may have so 
limited human rights claims against corporations abroad under the ATS as 
to render the liability concerns of international franchisors effectively 
moot. Yes, traditional American agency law might see these policies as 
moving into significant control, but as long as the violations by 
international franchisees are occurring abroad, the elements of the Kiobel 
touch and concern test are not likely to be satisfied and the franchisor will 
be shielded from liability notwithstanding their greater involvement in the 
setting of human rights policies and requirement of increased due 
diligence.
110
 Franchises may even be able to take the caveat about labor 
practices in other countries out of their human rights policies, and instead 
reach into franchisee employment practices a little more without risking 
liability in U.S. courts—the focus of the touch and concern test on the 
territory of the U.S., and not on questions of traditional common law 
agency, may mean that as long as the franchisors are violating human 
rights abroad, the franchisor might be insulated. 
Franchisors may have some constraints in their ability to monitor the 
daily labor practices of their franchisees abroad, but that is not any less 
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true for human rights than for the product or the menu or the color scheme, 
and yet franchises do specify the other items. The question still remains 
how to motivate franchisors to disseminate human rights due diligence 
practices along with directions on how to build a Big Mac.  
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